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Abstract
We consider a pure exchange nancial economy, where rational agents, possi-
bly asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately, with no model of how they
are determined. Therefore, agents face both exogenous uncertainty, on the future
state of nature, and endogenous uncertainty, on the future price. At a sequential
equilibrium, all consumers expect the true price as a possible outcome and elect
optimal strategies at the rst period, which clear on all markets, ex post. The pa-
pers purpose is twofold. First, it denes no-arbitrage prices, which comprise all
equilibrium prices, and displays their revealing properties. Second, it shows, under
mild conditions, that a sequential equilibrium always exists in this model, whatever
agentsprior beliefs or the nancial structure. This outcome suggests that standard
existence problems, which followed Hart (1975) and Radner (1979), stem from the
rational expectation and perfect foresight assumptions of the classical model.
.
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nancial markets, asymmetric information, arbitrage.
JEL Classication: D52
1 University of Pau, 1 Av. du Doyen Poplawski, 64000 Pau, France.
University of Paris 1, 106-112 Boulevard de lHôpital, 75013 Paris, France.
Email: lionel.deboisde¤re@univ-pau.fr
0
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.37
1 Introduction
The traditional approach to sequential nancial equilibrium relies on Radners
(1972-1979) classical, but restrictive, assumptions that agents have the so-called
rational expectationsof private information signals, and perfect foresightof future
prices. Along the former assumption, agents are endowed, quoting Radner, with
a model of how equilibrium prices are determined and (possibly) infer private
information of other agents from comparing actual prices and price expectations
with theoretical values at a price revealing equilibrium. Along the latter assumption,
agents anticipate with certainty exactly one price for each commodity (or asset) in
each prospective state, which turns out to be the true price if that state prevails.
Both assumptions presume much of agentsinference and computational capacities.
Both assumptions lead to classical cases of inexistence of equilibrium, as shown by
Radner (1979), Hart (1975), Momi (2000), Busch-Govindan (2004), among others.
Under standard regularity conditions and with real assets, the perfect foresight
equilibrium is generically locally unique or determinate, as shown by Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986). Thus, with two periods, agents knowing all the primi-
tives of the economy and endowed with su¢ cient computational capacities, could
typically identify prices contingent on each future state, from observing rst pe-
riod prices (provided they be equilibrium prices), and select the corresponding
anticipations, as in the Radner classical model.
Making such inferences is yet highly hypothetical and builds on equilibrium be-
ing locally unique or determinate. With private beliefs, we argue in Section 4, this
outcome no longer holds. Circumventing these inferences, the temporary equilib-
rium literature, developed by Green (1973) or Grandmont (1977), among others,
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drops such anticipation assumptions, but at the cost of loosing agentscoordina-
tion across periods. In this literature, as time unfolds, agents would typically revise
their plans and beliefs, ex post, face bankruptcy, meet unanticipated prices or wel-
fare increasing retrade opportunities. These outcomes are ruled out by the classical
sequential equilibrium model, as though there were a tradeo¤ between making ex-
treme anticipation assumptions or loosing coordination across time. As Grandmont
(1982) noticed, the temporary and perfect foresight equilibrium literatures followed
separate paths, but stood for the two classical streams of general equilibrium theory.
Our belief is that coordination across periods can obtain under much weaker
anticipation assumptions than perfect foresight. Pursuing earlier work with Bernard
Cornet, we now propose a setting, where rational agents, possibly asymmetrically
informed, form their anticipations privately, with no price model, may update their
beliefs from observing market prices, and reach equilibrium with correct forecasts.
Dropping both assumptions of rational expectations and perfect foresight, this
setting proposes to bridge a link between the two classical concepts of equilibrium. It
also improves the existence properties of the standard sequential equilibrium model.
Whatever the nancial structure or agentsprior beliefs, we show hereafter that a
sequential equilibrium exists in our model, as long as consumers take into account
the additional uncertainty stemming from their unawareness of other agentsbeliefs.
The current model extends one with B. Cornet [4], which dropped rational expec-
tations only. The latter model provided the basic tools, concepts and properties for
an arbitrage theory, embedding jointly the symmetric and asymmetric information
cases. It turned out to solve the existence problems due to asymmetric information
pointed out by Radner (1979). Indeed, we proved in [6] that a nancial equilibrium
with nominal assets existed in this model, not only generically - as in Radners
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(1979) rational expectations model - but under the very same no-arbitrage condi-
tion, with symmetric and asymmetric information, that is, under the generalized
no-arbitrage condition introduced in [4]. This result was consistent and extended
David Cass(1984) standard existence theorem to asymmetric information.
Complementing this result in [5], we showed with Bernard Cornet how asymmet-
rically informed agents, endowed with no expectations a la Radner (1979), could
rene their information from observing prices. This former model, however, did not
explain how agents reached perfect forecasts of spot prices in realizable states, while
they had private anticipations in idiosyncratic states and no Radner price model.
In the current paper, we address this issue and extend our earlier model to all
nancial structures. As anticipations are now private, agents would no longer be
certain which price might prevail tomorrow. Equilibrium prices would typically
depend on all agentsprivate forecasts today. Hence, they would face an additional
endogenous uncertainty, referring to the endogenous price variables.
This double uncertainty is encaptured in a two-period pure exchange economy,
where agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, face exogenous uncertainty, rep-
resented by nitely many states of nature, exchange consumption goods on spot
markets, and - nominal or real - assets on nancial markets, but also face endoge-
nous uncertainty on prices, in each state they expect. They have private sets of state
and price forecasts, distributed along idiosyncratic probability laws, called beliefs.
The current models equilibrium, or correct foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.), is
reached when all agents, today, anticipate tomorrows trueprice as a possible out-
come, and elect optimal strategies, which clear on all markets at both time periods.
This equilibrium concept is, indeed, a sequential one. It di¤ers from the traditional
3
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temporary equilibrium notion, introduced by Hicks (1939) and developed, later, by
Grandmont (1977, 1982), Green (1973), Hammond (1983), Balasko (2003), among
others. Such typical outcomes of the temporary equilibrium as bankruptcy or a
welfare increasing retrade opportunity, ex post, are inconsistent with our concept.
After presenting the model, we propose a notion of no-arbitrage prices, which
always exist, encompass equilibrium prices, and may reveal information to agents
having no clue of how market prices are determined. We show that any agent can
infer enough information from no-arbitrage prices to free markets from arbitrage.
Next, we study the existence issue, and suggest how the correct foresight equlib-
rium might solve the classical problems, which followed, not only Radners (1979)
rational expectations equilibrium (as we had already shown in [6]), but also Hart
(1975), Momi (2001), Busch-Govindan (2004), among others. Namely, we prove
that a C.F.E. exists whenever agentsanticipations embed a so-called minimum
uncertainty set, corresponding to the incompressible uncertainty which may re-
main in a private belief economy. Then, equilibrium prices always exist, and reveal
to rational agents, whenever required, their own sets of anticipations at equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows: we present the model, in Section 2, the concept
of no-arbitrage prices and the information they reveal, in Section 3, the minimum
uncertainty set and the existence Theorem, in Section 4. We prove this theorem, in
Section 5, di¤ering to an Appendix the proof of technical Lemmas.
2 The basic model
We consider a pure-exchange economy with two periods (t 2 f0; 1g), a commodity
market and a nancial market, where agents (at t = 0) may be asymmetrically
4
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informed and face an endogenous uncertainty on future prices. The sets of agents,
I := f1; :::;mg, commodities, L := f1; :::; Lg, states of nature, S := f1; :::; Tg, and assets,
J := f1; :::; Jg, are all nite (i.e., (m;L; T; J) 2 N4).
2.1 The models notations
Throughout, we denote by  the scalar product and k:k the Euclidean norm on
an Euclidean space and by B(K) the Borel sigma-algebra of a topological set, K.
We let s = 0 be the non-random state at t = 0 and S 0 := f0g[S. For all set   S 0
and tuple (s; l; x; x0; y; y0) 2 LRRRLRL, we denote by:
 xs 2 R, ys 2 RL the scalar and vector, indexed by s 2 , of x, y, respectively;
 yls the lth component of ys 2 RL;
 x 6 x0 and y 6 y0 (respectively, x << x0 and y << y0) the relations xs 6 x0s
and yls 6 y0ls (resp., xs < x0s and yls < y0ls ) for each (l; s) 2 f1; :::; Lg;
 x < x0 (resp., y < y0) the joint relations x 6 x0, x 6= x0 (resp., y 6 y0, y 6= y0);
 RL+ = fx 2 RL : x > 0g and R+ := fx 2 R : x > 0g,
RL++ := fx 2 RL : x >> 0g and R++ := fx 2 R : x >> 0g;
 M0 := f(p0; q) 2 RL+RJ : kp0k+ kqk = 1g;
 Ms := f(s; p) 2 S  RL+ : kpk = 1g, for every s 2 S;
 M := [s2SMs, a topological subset of the Euclidean space RL+1;
 B(!; ") := f!02M: k!0 !k < "g, for every pair (!; ") 2M R++;
 P () := f!2M : (B(!; "))>0; 8">0g, the support of a probability, , on (M;B(M));
 (P ), for any closed set, P  M, the set of probabilities on (M;B(M)), whose
support (as dened above) is P .
5
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2.2 The commodity and asset markets
The L consumption goods, l 2 L, may be exchanged by consumers, on the spot
markets of both periods. In each state, s 2 S, an expectation of a spot price, p 2 RL+,
or the spot price, p, in state s itself, are denoted by the pair !s := (s; p) 2 S  RL+.
Since we are only concerned about relative prices on each spot market, we will take
admissible prices and price forecasts into the set M.
Each agent, i 2 I, is granted an endowment, ei := (eis) 2 RLS0+ , which secures her
the commodity bundle, ei0 2 RL+ at t = 0, and eis 2 RL+, in each state s 2 S, if this
state prevails at t = 1. To harmonize notations, for every triple (i; s; !) 2 I  S0 Ms,
we will also refer to ei! := eis. Ex post, the generic ith agents welfare is measured
by a continuous utility index, ui : R2L+ ! R+, over her consumptions at both dates.
The nancial market permits limited transfers across periods and states, via J
assets, or securities, j 2 J := f1; :::; Jg, which are exchanged at t = 0 and pay o¤ at
t = 1. In any contingent state, assets pay o¤ in a xed amount of account units
and/or commodities. For any forecast ! 2 M, the cash payo¤s, vj(!) 2 R, of all
assets, j 2 f1; :::; Jg, conditional on the occurence of (state and) price !, dene a row
vector, V (!) = (vj(!)) 2 RJ . For example, given ! := (s; p) 2M, if asset j 2 J promises
to pay exactly the commodity bundle vsj 2 RL+ in a state s 2 S, then, vj(!) = p  vsj .
This specication makes the mapping ! 7! V (!) continuous. The market may be
incomplete, in the sense that the span of payo¤s, f(V (!s)z)s2S : z 2 RJg may have
lower rank (for any price collection (!s) 2 s2S Ms) than the number of states, #S.
As we show later, equilibrium with private beliefs is consistent with agents having
uncountable sets of anticipations in any state. Insuring the price risk completely,
via contingent contracts, if possible, would not be far less demanding than setting
6
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the complete market of contingent goods in the Debreu model. In the end, it is
likely that the contingent contracts on goods would be issued and preferred by
agents to the contingent contracts on prices only. Why, indeed, would it be possible
to insure today the price of a desired quantity of one good on a particular spot
market tomorrow, and not be able to exchange the corresponding contingent good
directly today? Thus, we would resume the Debreu model, which is inconsistent
with incomplete markets. To simplify exposition, we have, therefore, assumed that
assets provided no insurance against endogenous uncertainty.
Agents can take unrestrained positions (positive, if purchased; negative, if sold),
in each security, which are the components of a portfolio, z 2 RJ . Given an asset
price, q 2 RJ , a portofolio, z 2 RJ , is thus a contract, which costs q z units of account
at t = 0, and promises to pay V (!)  z units tomorrow, for each expectation ! 2 M,
if ! obtains. Similarly, we normalize rst period prices, !0 := (p0; q), to the set M0.
2.3 Information and beliefs
Ex ante, the generic agent, i 2 I, is endowed with a private idiosyncratic set of
anticipations, Pi  M, according to which she believes tomorrows true state and
price (i.e., which will prevail at t = 1) will fall into Pi. Consistently with [4], this set,
Pi  SRL, encompasses a private information signal, Si  S, that the true state will
be in Si (i.e., Pi  SiRL). Agents are assumed to receive no wrong signal, that is,
no state will prevail tomorrow, out of the pooled information set, S := \iSi.
We believe that a typical rational agent would not forecast a single price in
each state she expects, since prices would now depend on all other agentsprivate
forecasts. Yet, from observing markets, she might update her beliefs. Using sub-
Section 2.1s notations, these features are encaptured in the following denitions.
7
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Denition 1 A closed subset of (S  RL++) \M is called an anticipation set. Its ele-
ments are called anticipations, expectations or forecasts. We denote by A the set of
all anticipation sets. A collection (Pi) 2 Am is called an anticipation structure if:
(a) \mi=1Pi 6= ?.
We denote by AS the set of anticipation structures. A structure, (P 0i ) 2 AS, is said
to rene, or to be a renement of (Pi) 2 AS, and we denote it by (P 0i )  (Pi), if:
(b) P 0i  Pi; 8i 2 I.
A renement, (P 0i ) 2 AS, of (Pi) 2 AS, is said to be self-attainable if:
(c) \mi=1P 0i = \mi=1Pi.
A belief is a probability, , on (M;B(M)), whose support is an anticipation set, i.e.,
P () 2 A (as denoted in sub-Section 2.1). A structure of beliefs is a collection of
beliefs, (i), whose supports dene an anticipation structure (i.e., (P (i)) 2 AS).
We denote by B and SB, respectively, the sets of beliefs and structures of beliefs.
A structure, (0i) 2 SB, is said to rene (i) 2 BS, which we denote (0i)  (i), if
(P (0i))  (P (i)). The renement, (0i), is self-attainable if \mi=1P (0i) = \mi=1P (i).
Remark 1 Along the above Denition, an anticipation set is a closed set of spot
prices (at t = 1), whose values are never zero. A belief is a probability distribution
on (M;B(M)), which cannot put a positive weight on arbitrarily low prices. Agents
anticipations or beliefs form a structure when they have some forecasts in common.
The set of common forecasts is left unchanged at a self-attainable renement.
2.4 Consumersbehavior and the notion of equilibrium
Agents implement their decisions at t = 0, after having reached their nal beliefs,
(i) 2 SB, from observing market prices, !0 := (p0; q) 2M0, along a rational behavior
described in Section 3, below. Hereafter, the nal prices and beliefs at t = 0 are
8
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given, and markets, consistently, are assumed to have eliminated useless deals, that
is, f(zi) 2 RJm :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0; V (!i)zi = 0;8(i; !i) 2 IP (i)g = f0g. The generic ith
agents consumption set is that of continuous mappings from f0g [ P (i) to RL+:
X(i) := C (f0g [ P (i); RL+).
Thus, her consumptions, x 2 X(i), are mappings, relating s = 0 to a consump-
tion decision, x0 := x!0 2 RL+, at t = 0, and, continuously on P (i), every expectation,
! := (s; p) 2 P (i), to a consumption decision, x! 2 RL+, at t = 1, which is conditional
on the joint observation of state s, and price p, on the spot market. The generic ith
agent elects a strategy, (x; z) 2 X(i)RJ , she can always a¤ord with her endowment.
This denes her budget set as follows:
Bi(!0; i) := f(x; z) 2 X(i)RJ : p0(x0 ei0)6  qz and ps(x! ei!)6V (!)z; 8! := (s; ps) 2 P (i)g.
Each agent i 2 I has preferences represented by the V.N.M. utility function:
x 2 X(i) 7! Ui(i; x) :=
R
!2P (i) ui(x0; x!)di(!).
The generic ith agent elects an optimal strategy in her buget set. The above econ-
omy is denoted by E . It retains the standard small consumer price-taker hypothesis,
along which no single agents belief, or strategy, may alone have a signicant impact
on prices. It is said to be standard if, moreover, it meets the following Conditions:
 Assumption A1: for each i 2 I; ei >> 0;
 Assumption A2: for each i 2 I, ui is continuous and strictly concave;
 Assumption A3: for any (i; l; t) 2 ILf0; 1g, the mapping (x0; x1) 7! @ui(x0; x1)=@xlt
is dened and continuous on f(x0; x1) 2 R2L+ : xlt > 0g, and (inf A @ui(x0; x1)=@xlt) > 0 ,
for every bounded subset A  f(x0; x1) 2 R2L+ : xlt > 0g.
9
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Remark 2 Assumption A1 is the standard strong survivals. Assumption A2
could be weakened on strict concavity, but is retained to alleviate a tedious proof in
Section 5. Assumption A3 is consistent with agents having positive price forecasts,
along Denition 1. It does not require, but allows for the standard Inada Conditions.
The economys concept of equilibrium is dened as follows:
Denition 2 A collection of prices, !s 2 Ms, dened for each s 2 S0, beliefs, i 2 B,
and strategies, (xi; zi) 2 Bi(!0; i), for each i 2 I, is a sequential equilibrium of the
economy E, or correct foresight equilibrium (CFE), if the following Conditions hold:
(a) 8s 2 S, !s 2 \mi=1P (i);
(b) 8i 2 I; (xi; zi) 2 arg max(x;z)2Bi(!0;i) Ui(i; x);
(c) 8s 2 S0; Pmi=1(xi!s ei!s) = 0;
(d)
Pm
i=1 zi = 0.
Under the above conditions, the beliefs, i, for each i 2 I, or the prices, !s, for each
s 2 S0, are said to support the equilibrium.
Remark 3 In the case where #P (i) = #Si, for every i 2 I, the above notion of
equilibrium coincides with that of [6], that is, with a perfect foresight equilibrium
with (a possible) asymmetric information.
3 No-arbitrage prices and the information they reveal
Extending our earlier papers with Bernard Cornet ([4], [5]), we now dene and
characterize no-arbitrage prices and their revealing properties.
3.1 No-arbitrage prices
Recalling the notations of sub-Section 2.1, we rst dene no-arbitrage prices.
10
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Denition 3 Let an anticipation set, P 2 A, and a price, q 2 RJ , be given. Price q is
said to be a no-arbitrage price of P , or P to be q-arbitrage-free, if:
(a) @z 2 RJ :  q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0, 8! 2 P , with one strict inequality;
We denote by Q(P ) the set of no-arbitrage prices of P .
Let a structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and, for each i 2 I, the above price set, Q(Pi), be given.
We refer to Qc[(Pi)] := \mi=1Q(Pi) as the set of common no-arbitrage prices of (Pi). The
structure, (Pi), is said to be arbitrage-free (respectively, q-arbitrage-free) if Qc[(Pi)]
is non-empty (resp., if q 2 Qc[(Pi)]). We say that q is a no-arbitrage price of (Pi),
and denote it by q 2 Q[(Pi)], if there exists a renement, (P i ), of (Pi), such that
q 2 Qc[(P i )]. Moreover, if (P i ) is self-attainable, q 2 Qc[(P i )] is called self-attainable.
The above denitions and notations extend to any consistent beliefs, (i) 2 mi=1(Pi),
as denoted in sub-Section 2.1. We then refer to Q(i) := Q(Pi), for each i 2 I, and to
Qc[(i)] := Qc[(Pi)] and Q[(i)] := Q[(Pi)] as, respectively, the sets of no-arbitrage prices
of i, and of common no-arbitrage prices, and no-arbitrage prices, of the beliefs (i).
Remark 4 A symmetric renement of any structure (Pi) 2 AS, that is, (P 0i )  (Pi),
such that P 0i = P 01, for every i 2 I, is always arbitrage-free along Denition 3. Hence,
any structure, (Pi) 2 AS, admits a self-attainable no-arbitrage price. Indeed, the
symmetric renement, (P i )  (Pi), such that P 1 = \mi=1Pi is arbitrage-free.
Claim 1 states a simple but useful property of arbitrage-free structures.
Claim 1 An arbitrage-free structure, (Pi) 2 AS, satises the following Assertion:
(i) @(zi) 2 RJm :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!)  z > 0, 8! 2 [mi=1Pi, with one strict inequality.
Proof Let (Pi) be an arbitrage-free anticipation structure and q 2 Qc[(Pi)] 6= ? be
given. Assume, by contraposition, that there exists (zi) 2 (RJ)m, such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0
and V (!)  z > 0, for every 8! 2 [mi=1Pi, with one strict inequality, say for ! 2 P1. If
11
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q  z1 6 0, then, q =2 Q(P1), which contradicts the fact that q 2 Qc[(Pi)]. Hence, q  z1 > 0,
which implies, from the relation
Pm
i=1 zi = 0, that q  zi < 0, for some i 2 I. Then, the
above inequalities yield q =2 Q(Pi), contradicting the above relation, q 2 Qc[(Pi)]. 
3.2 Individual anticipations revealed by prices
Claim 2 tackles the notion of information conveyed by prices to individual agents.
Claim 2 Let (Pi) 2 AS, and q 2 RJ , be given. Then, for each i 2 I, there exists a
set, Pi(q) 2 f?g [ A, said to be revealed by price q to agent i, such that:
(i) if Pi(q) 6= ?, then, Pi(q)  Pi and Pi(q) is q-arbitrage-free;
(ii) every q-arbitrage-free anticipation set included in Pi is a subset of Pi(q).
Proof Let i 2 I, q 2 RJ and (Pi) 2 AS be given. Let R(Pi;q) be the set of q-arbitrage-
free anticipation sets included in Pi. If R(Pi;q) = ?, then, the set Pi(q) = ? meets the
conditions of Claim 2. If R(Pi;q) 6= ?, we let P i := [ fP 0i : P 0i 2 R(Pi;q)g be the closed
nonempty set including all elements of R(Pi;q). By construction, P i is an anticipation
set included in Pi (a closed set), which meets Assertion (ii) of Claim 2.
Assume, by contraposition, that P i does not meet Assertion (i), that is, there
exists z 2 RJ and ! 2 P i , such that  q  z > 0, V (!)  z > 0 for every ! 2 P i , and
(V (!)  z   q  z) > 0. From the denition of P i and the continuity of V , the relation
(V (!)  z   q  z) > 0 implies that there exists P 0i 2 R(Pi;q) and !0 2 P 0i such that
(V (!0)  z   q  z) > 0. Since P 0i  P i is q-arbitrage-free, the above relations,  q  z > 0,
V (!) z > 0 for every ! 2 P i , imply, from Denition 3, that  q z = 0 and V (!) z = 0 for
every ! 2 P 0i , which contradicts the fact that (V (!0)  z   q  z) > 0. This contradiction
proves that P i meets both conditions of Claim 2 and completes the proof. 
12
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.37
3.3 Anticipation structures revealed by prices
The following Claim characterizes the no-arbitrage prices of Denition 3.
Claim 3 Let a price, q 2 RJ , an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and the related set
collection, (Pi(q)), of Claim 2, be given. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) q is a no-arbitrage price of (Pi);
(ii) (Pi(q)) is the coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of (Pi);
(iii) (Pi(q)) is a renement of (Pi);
(iv) (Pi(q)) is an anticipation structure.
If q 2 Q[(Pi)] is self-attainable, the above renement, (Pi(q))  (Pi), is self-attainable.
Proof Assertion (i)) (ii) Let q 2 Q[(Pi)] be given. From Denition 3, we set as
given an arbitrary q-arbitrage-free renement, (P i ), of (Pi). Then, for each i 2 I, the
set, R(Pi;q), of q-arbitrage-free anticipation sets included in Pi is non-empty (for it
contains P i ). From Claim 2, the set, R(Pi;q), admits Pi(q) 6= ? for maximal element,
hence, P i  Pi(q)  Pi and q 2 Q(Pi(q)). The latter relations imply: (P i )(Pi(q))(Pi)
and q 2 Qc[(Pi(q))]. Hence, (Pi(q)) is the coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of (Pi).
Assertion (ii)) (iii)) (iv) The relations are immediate from Denition 1.
Assertion (iv)) (i) If (Pi(q)) 2 AS, then, from Claim 2, (Pi(q)) renes (Pi) and is
q-arbitrage-free, that is, q 2 Qc[(Pi(q))]  Q[(Pi)].
The end of Claim 3, left to readers, is immediate from Denition 1 and above. 
Denition 4 Let an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and a no-arbitrage price, q 2
Q[(Pi)], be given. The renement, (Pi(q))  (Pi), of Claim 3 is said to be revealed by
price q. A renement, (P 0i ), of (Pi) is said to be price-revealable if it can be revealed
by some price, i.e., there exists q0 2 Q[(Pi)] such that (P 0i ) = (Pi(q0)) along Claim 3.
Whenever q 2 Qc[(Pi)], we say that (Pi) is revealed by price q, hence, price-revealable.
13
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Extending Cornet-de Boisde¤re (2009), we now examine how agents, endowed
with no price model, may update their anticipations from observing market prices.
3.4 Sequential renement through prices
Throughout, we let an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, a generic agent, i 2 I,
and an asset price, q 2 RJ , be given. We study how this ith agent, endowed with
the initial set of anticipations, Pi, may update her forecasts from observing price q.
In successive steps (denoted by n 2 N)2 , she rules out her arbitrage anticipations,
namely, those anticipations which would grant her an arbitrage, if correct. She
would do so when she believes that price q reects an information she misses. The
elimination of arbitrage anticipations in one step may result in new arbitrage antic-
ipations in the next step. After nitely many inference steps, however, no arbitrage
anticipation remains, that is, the agents (rened) anticipation set is nal.
We thus dene, by induction, two sequences, fAni gn2N and fPni gn2N as follows:
 for n = 1, we let A1i = ? and P 1i := Pi;
 for n 2 N arbitrary, with Ani and Pni dened at step n, we let An+1i := Pn+1i := ?,
if Pni = ?, and, otherwise,
An+1i := f! 2 Pni : 9z 2 RJ ;  q  z > 0; V (!)  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0; 8! 2 Pni g;
Pn+1i := P
n
i n An+1i , i.e., the agent rules out anticipations, granting an arbitrage.
Claim 4 Let an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, an agent, i 2 I, a price,
q 2 RJ , and the information set, Pi(q), it reveals along Claim 2, be given. The
above set sequences, fAni gn2N and fPni gn2N, satisfy the following assertions:
(i) 9N 2 N : 8n > N; Ani = ? and Pni = PNi ;
(ii) PNi = limn!1 P
n
i = Pi(q).
2 We always dene the set, N, of natural numbers as starting from 1 (and not 0).
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Proof Let (Pi) 2 AS, i 2 I, q 2 RJ , Pi(q), fAni gn2N and fPni gn2N be dened or set
as given as in Claim 4, and let P i := \n2NPni = limn!1 & Pni .
With a non-restrictive convention that the empty set be included in any other
set, we show, rst, that the inclusion Pi(q)  Pni holds for every n 2 N. It holds, from
Claim 2, for n = 1 (since Pi(q)  P 1i := Pi). Assume, now, by contraposition, that,
for some n 2 N, Pi(q)  Pni and Pi(q) * Pn+1i . Then, there exist ! 2 Pi(q) \ An+1i and
z 2 RJ , such that  q z > 0, V (!) z > 0 and V (!) z > 0, for every ! 2 Pi(q)  Pni , which
contradicts Claim 2, along which Pi(q) is q-arbitrage-free, if non-empty. Hence, the
relation Pi(q)  Pni , holds for every n 2 N.
Assume, rst, that P i := \n2NPni = ?. Since the sequence fPni gn2N is non-increasing
and made of compact or empty sets (this stems, by induction, from the fact that
P 1i is compact and An+1 is open in Pni or empty), there exists N 2 N, such that
Pni = A
n
i = ?, for all n > N . Then, from above, Claim 4-(i)-(ii) hold (with Pi(q) = ?).
Assume, next, that P i 6= ?. Then, P i , a non-empty intersection of compact sets,
is compact, and, from above, Pi(q)  P i .
For every n 2 N, let Zoni := fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 Pni g. Since fPni gn2N is
non-increasing, the sequence of vector spaces, fZoni g, is non-decreasing in RJ , hence,
stationary. We let N 2 N be such that Zoni = ZoNi , for every n > N . Assume, by
contraposition, that assertion (i) of Claim 4 fails, that is:
8n 2 N; 9(!n; zn) 2 Pni  RJ :  q  zn > 0; V (!n)  zn > 0 and V (!)  zn > 0; 8! 2 Pni .
From the denition of the sets Pni and P
n+1
i 6= ?, the above potfolios satisfy,
for each n > N , jointly zn =2 Zoni and zn 2 Zo(n+1)i , which contradicts the fact that
Zon+1i = Z
on
i . This contradiction proves Claim 4-(i), and we let N 2 N be such that
15
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AN+1i = ?. Then, by construction, PNi = P i , and P i  Pi is q-arbitrage-free (since
AN+1i =?), which yields, from Claim 2, P i  Pi(q), and, from above, P i = Pi(q). 
The above inference process is a rational behavior, whereby agents, having no
clue of how market prices are determined, update their beliefs from observing them
in nitely many inference steps. As long as markets have not reached a no-arbitrage
price, traders cannnot agree on prices and a sequential equilibrium may not exist.
Claims 3 and 4 show that agents have common updated forecasts - a necessary
condition for a sequential equilibrium to exist - if, and only if, the observed asset
price is a no-arbitrage price. We have seen such prices always exist. We will see below
that equilibrium prices are always no-arbitrage prices. Hence, agents may infer
their own anticipation sets from observing the current equilibrium price (whenever
it exists). We then speak of a price-revealed equilibrium.
We now introduce and discuss the notion of minimum price uncertainty, with
private beliefs, and state our Theorem.
4 Minimum uncertainty and existence of equilibrium
4.1 The existence Theorem
With private idiosyncratic beliefs, a nonempty set of minimum uncertainty exists,
any element of which can obtain as an equilibrium price for some beliefs today.
Denition 5 Let 
 be the set of sequential equilibria (CFE) of the economy, E. The
minimum uncertainty set, , is the subset of prices at t = 1, which support a CFE,
namely:  = f! = (s; p) 2M : s 2 S; 9((!s); (i); [(xi; zi)]) 2 
; ! = !sg.
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The following Theorem states existence properties of a standard economy.
Theorem 1 Let a standard economy, E, its minimum uncertainty set, , and an
anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, be given. Then, the following Assertions hold:
(i) 9" > 0 : 8(s; p) 2 , 8l 2 L, pl > ";
(ii)  6= ?.
Consistently, if   Pi holds for each i 2 I , then, the following Assertions also hold:
(iii) if (Pi) 2 AS is arbitrage-free, then, any beliefs (i) 2 mi=1 (Pi) support a CFE;
(iv) if a self-attainable renement, (P i )  (Pi), is arbitrage-free (and that renement
exists), any consistent beliefs, (i ) 2 mi=1 (P i ), as denoted in 2.1, support a CFE;
(v) if (P i ) 2 AS is a self-attainable price-revealable renement of (Pi) (which exists),
then, every renement (i ) 2 mi=1 (P i ) supports a price-revealed CFE.
Remark 5 Using the notations of Theorem 1, Assertion (iii) implies (iv), by replac-
ing the structure (Pi) by (P i )  (Pi). Moreover, we let the reader check, as standard
from Assumption A3, that whenever a structure (i ) 2 SB and price !0 := (p0; q) 2M0
support a CFE, then, q 2 Qc[(i )]. Consequently, if a renement, (i ) 2 SB, is price-
revealable and supports a CFE, that CFE is revealed by the equilibrium price.
Hence, Assertion (iv) implies (v) and only Assertions (i)-(ii)-(iii) need be proved.
Before discussing the Theorems Condition,   \mi=1Pi, we prove Assertion (i).
Proof of Assertion (i) Let 
 and  be the sets of Denition 5. Let s 2 S,
! := (s; p) 2 , and an equilibrium, C := ((!s); (i); [(xi; zi)]) 2 
, such that ! = !s ,
be given. The relation p >> 0 is standard from Assumption A3 and Denition 2-(b).
Let e := (min(i;s;l)2IS0L elis) 2 R++ and E := (max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is) 2 R++ be given.
Then, for each s 2 S0, the relations (xi!s) > 0 and
Pm
i=1(xi!s eis) = 0, which hold from
Denition 2-(c), yield xi!s 2 [0; E]L, for each i 2 I. For each l 2 L, the above relations
17
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imply that at least one agent, say i = 1, does not sell the lth good in state s, so that
xl1!s 2 [e; E]. From Assumption A3, the mapping, (x0; x1) 7! @ui(x0; x1)=@xl1, for each
i 2 I, attains a maximum on the set X l := f(x0; x1) 2 [0; E]2L : xl1 > e g, and we let:
 := inf @ui(x0; x1)=@x
l
1, for (i; l; (x0; x1)) 2 IL[0; E]2L, and  := max @ui(x0; x1)=@xl1,
for (i; l; (x0; x1)) 2 ILX l, be strictly postive numbers. Let  = = and (l; l0) 2 L2 be
given. Assume, by contraposition, that pl=pl0 >  and let i 2 I be an agent, unwilling
to sell good l 2 L, under her consumption decision, xi! . We let the reader check, as
tedious and standard, that agent i, starting from (xi; zi), could nd a utility increas-
ing strategy, (xi ; zi) 2 Bi(!0; i), modifying her consumptions in state s only, such
that xli! < xli! and xl
0
i! > x
l0
i! . Indeed, with pl=pl
0
> , she has an incentive to sell
a small amount of commodity l in exchange for commodity l0. Hence, (xi; zi) cannot
be an equilibrium strategy. This contradiction proves the relation pl=pl0 6 . Then,
we let the reader check from the joint relations p >> 0, kpk = 1 and pl=pl0 6 , for
each pair (l; l0) 2 L2, which hold from above, that pl > " = 1=pL, for every l 2 L. 
4.2 The Theorems Condition
In Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), the perfect foresight equilibrium is
generically locally unique or determinate. This outcome, it has been argued, would
enable rational agents knowing the primitives of the economy to identify prices
contingent on each future state, from observing rst period equilibrium prices. Such
inferences preclude any defect in agentscomputations.
It is also well known that perfect foresight equilibrium prices would only obtain,
in general, if all such sophisticatedagents shared the same beliefs. This setting
rules out the possibility that some agents deviated or be uncertain of future prices.
Perfect price anticipations need be common and accepted by all consumers (amongst
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possibilities), despite contradictory buyer/seller interests. Thus, it is reasonable to
believe, although not formally required, that the perfect price forecasts are common
knowledge. If not, tomorrows prices might fail to have been anticipated correctly by
anyone, e.g., if some agentsbeliefs suddenly and privately changed before trading.
Moreover, the theoretical inferences presented above build on equilibrium prices
being locally unique or determinate. This outcome is, by no means, guaranteed
under private beliefs. Along Theorem 1, equilibrium is consistent with agents having
uncountable sets of anticipations in any state, as well as uncountably many di¤erent
beliefs, given anticipations. Hence, it seems wise to believe (from Berges Theorem)
that, typically, the nonempty set  is also uncountable. Then, local uniqueness fails.
As explained below, infering the set , or a bigger set, would not require the
primitives of the economy be known, or a price model be used. However, that set
should be included in agentsanticipations. Indeed, with price-takers agents seeing
other consumersbeliefs as arbitrary, the set, , of all possible equilibrium prices,
for some structure of beliefs today, may be seen as one of incompressible uncertainty
by agents. From Theorem 1, the Condition,   \mi=1Pi, is su¢ cient to insure the
existence of a CFE. But it might also be a necessary one, especially if beliefs are
so unpredictable and erratic to let any price in  be a possible outcome. We think
this situation might arise, in particular, in times of enhanced uncertainty, volatility
or erratic change in beliefs, letting no chance to agents to coordinate themselves.
If cautious agents should embed the minimum uncertainty set into their antici-
pations, the question arises why and how this might happen. As for the renement
mechanism described in Section 3, we suggest this could be achieved, with no price
model, from observing markets. Since we are only interested in normalised prices, it
is generally possible to observe past prices and reckon their relative values on long
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time series and in a wide array of economic events, representing virtually all states
of nature. For example, the price of many assets are known daily (hence, in the
daily state), on several decades. Long statistics also exist for consumption prices.
Along time series, relative prices would vary between observable boundaries.
It seems reasonable to assume that they were sequential equilibrium prices along
Denition 2. If series are long enough and if we assume that future behaviors may
replicate some past ones, then, for instance, the intervals between the lower and up-
per bounds of the relative prices, observed in the various states, could be thought to
embed the set . A method of the kind is empirical, based on statistical analysis, not
on rational expectations. It does not require a demanding price model or awareness
of the economys primitives. It needs not be implemented by agents individually,
but only by a public agent or tradehouse. This method, we think, could have many
useful applications in nance. It could also provide estimates for reasonable beliefs.
Thus, from observing markets, we think the set , or a bigger set, might be
inferred by a public agent. In addition, individual agents may have idiosyncratic
uncertainty, given their personal information or feelings. So, neither beliefs, nor
their supports, need be symmetric or reduce to .
We showed that agents, starting from an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, such
that   \mi=1Pi, and observing a self-attainable equilibrium price (which exists),
reach a unique equilibrium renement, (P i )  (Pi), from making inferences as in
Section 3. With no price model, agents cannot infer more. From Theorem 1, once
they have reached the renement (P i ), all possible equilibrium prices at t = 0,
which are related to beliefs (i ) 2 mi=1(P i ), along sub-Section 2.1, reveal the same
structure, (P i ). This is another di¤erence with the classical model: possibly di¤erent
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equilibrium prices at t = 0, related to all beliefs (i ) 2 mi=1(P i ), reveal exactly the
same anticipation sets, (P i )  (Pi), which are xed and may di¤er across agents.
In all cases, agentsnal beliefs, (i ) 2 mi=1(P i ), remain private. This privacy,
agentsxed expectations sets, (P i ), and the Theorems Condition restore existence.
There can be no fall in rank problem a la Hart (1975). The generic ith agents budget
set and strategy are dened ex ante, with reference to ex ante conditions, and to a
xed set of anticipations, P i . So, only her ex ante span of payo¤s matters, namely,
< V;P i > := f! 2 P i 7! V (!)  z : z 2 RJg. That span is xed independently of any
equilibrium price, p 2   P i , whose location in the set  cannot be predicted at
t = 0 and will only be observed at t = 1. This setting is quite di¤erent from Harts.
5 The existence proof
Throughout, we set as given arbitrarily, in a standard economy, E , an arbitrage-
free anticipation structure, (Pi), and related beliefs, (i) 2 mi=1 (Pi), along sub-
Section 2.1s notations. These structures are, henceforth, xed and always referred
to. Along Remark 5, we will only prove assertions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 1.
The proofs principle is to construct a sequence of auxiliary economies, with nite
anticipation sets, rening and tending to the initial sets, (Pi). Each nite economy
admits an equilibrium, which we set as given along Theorem 1 of [6]. Then, the
sequence of nite dimensional equilibria yields an equilibrium of the economy E .
Each step of the proof uses simple mathematical arguments. Yet, it could not
avoid a tedious number of arguments and of subsequent notations, e.g., for specify-
ing the auxiliary economies, whose construction builds on the following Lemma.
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Lemma 1 For each i 2 I and each n 2 N, there exists a nite partition, Pni , and a
nite subset, 
ni , of Pi, such that the following Assertions hold:
(i) 8P 2 Pni ; P 2 B(M) and i(P ) > 0, and (
1i ) 2 AS;
(ii) 
ni  
n+1i , and, for every P 2 Pni , P \ 
ni is a singleton;
(iii) 8! 2 Pi, 9!0 2 
ni : k!0   !k 6 L#S = n, and, hence, Pi = [n2N
ni ;
(iv) 9N 2 N; 8(P i )  (Pi), [(
Ni )  (P i ) and #P i 2 N, 8i 2 I]) [Qc[(P i )] 6= ?].
Proof see the Appendix. 
For every integer n > N along Lemma 1, and any element  2 ]0; 1], hereafter set
as given, we now consider the following auxiliary economies, En , and equilibria, Cn .
5.2 Auxiliary economies, En
Henceforth, we set as given n > N , along Lemma 1, and, arbitrarily, a spot price,
!Ns := (s; p
N
s ) 2 Ms, for each s 2 S. Then, we dene by induction the economy En ,
and an equilibrium price of this economy, !ns 2Ms, for each s 2 S, as follows.
From the previous induction prices, (!n 1s ) 2 s2S Ms, the auxiliary economy,
En , is dened as one of the type described in [6]. Namely, it is a pure exchange
economy, with two period (t 2 f0; 1g), m agents, having incomplete information, and
exchanging L goods and J nominal assets, under uncertainty (at t = 0) about which
state of a nite state space, Sn, will prevail at t = 1. Formally, referring to [6]:
 The information structure is the collection, (Sni ), of sets Sni := S [ eSni , dened,
from Lemma 1, by eSni := fig
ni , for each i 2 I. The set of realizable states is
S := \i2ISi = \i2ISni . For each agent i 2 I, the set eSni consists of purely formal
states, none of which will prevail (but in the ith agents mind). The state space
of the economy is Sn = [i2ISni . For notational purposes, we also let S0n := f0g[Sn
and S0ni := f0g [ S0ni (for each i 2 I) include the rst period state, s = 0.
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 The SnJ payo¤matrix, V n := (V n(sn)), is dened, with reference to the payo¤
mapping, ! 7! V (!), by the row vectors V n(sn) := V (!) 2 RJ , for each sn := (i; !) 2
SnnS, and V n(s) := V (!n 1s ) 2 RJ , for each s 2 S. Hence, V n is purely nominal.
 In each formal state, sn := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni , the generic agent i 2 I is certain that
price ps 2 RL++, and only that price, can prevail on the ctitious sn-spot market.
 In each realizable state, s 2 S, the generic agent i 2 I has perfect foresight, i.e.,
anticipates with certainty the true price, say pns 2 RL++ (or !ns := (s; pns ) 2Ms).
 The generic ith agents endowment, eni := (enisn) 2 RLS
0n
i
++ , is dened by enisn := eis,
for each sn := s 2 S0, and enisn := eis, for each sn := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni .
 For all market prices, !n0 := (pn0 ; qn) 2 M0, at t = 0, and !ns := (s; pns ) 2 Ms, for
each s 2 S, the generic ith agent has for budget set and utility function:
Bni ([!
n
s ]) := { (x; z) 2 RLS
0n
i
+ RJ : pn0 (x0 ei0) 6  qnz and pns (xs eis) 6 V n(s)z; 8s 2 S
and ps(xsn eis) 6 V n(sn)z; 8sn := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni };
uni : x 7!
P
sn2Sni 
n
i (s
n)ui(x0; xsn), where
(1 + #S ) ni (s
n) :=
8>><>>:
i(P ) > 0 where P 2 Pni satisfies P \ 
ni = f!g; if sn = (i; !) 2 eSni
 > 0 if sn 2 S
Along Theorem 1 of [6], each auxiliary economy admits an equilibrium, Cn , with
the properties described in the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 For each n > N along Lemma 1, the economy En admits an equilibrium,
Cn , namely, a collection of prices, !n0 := (pn0 ; qn) 2M0, at t = 0, and !ns := (s; pns ) 2Ms,
in each state s 2 S, and strategies, (xni ; zni ) 2 Bni ([!ns ]), for each i 2 I, such that :
(i) 8i 2 I; (xni ; zni ) 2 arg max(x;z)2Bni ([!ns ]) uni (x);
(ii) 8s 2 S0; Pmi=1 (xnis   eis) = 0;
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(iii)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium, Cn , satises the following Assertions:
(iv) 8(n; i; s) 2 Nnf1; :::; Ng  I  S0, xnis 2 [0; E]L, where E := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is;
(v) 9" 2]0; 1] : pnls > ", 8(n; s; l) 2 Nnf1; :::; Ng  S L.
Proof see the Appendix. 
Along Lemma 2, we set as given an equilibrium of the economy En , namely:
Cn := (!n0 := (pn0 ; qn); (!ns ); [(xni ; zni )]) 2M0 s2S Ms mi=1 Bni ([!ns ]),
which is always referred to. The equilibrium prices, (!ns ) 2 s2SMs, permit to pursue
the induction and dene the economy En+1 in the same way as above, hence, the
auxiliary economies and equilibria at all ranks. These meet the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 For the above sequence, fCn g, of equilibria, it may be assumed to exist:
(i) !s = limn!1 !
n
s 2Ms, for each s 2 S0;
(ii) (xis) := limn!1 (x
n
is)i2I 2 RLm, such that
P
i2I (x

is   eis) = 0, for each s 2 S0;
(iii) (zi ) = limn!1(z
n
i )i2I 2 RJm, such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0.
Moreover, we dene, for each i 2 I and each n 2 N, the following sets and mappings:
* the mapping, ! 2 Pi 7! argni (!) 2 
ni , such that one P 2 Pni satises (!; argni (!) 2 P 2;
* from Assertion (i) and Lemma 2-(v), the belief, i := 11+#S ( i + 
P
s2S s),
where s is (for each s 2 S) the Diracs measure of !s;
* P i = Pi [ f!sgs2S, the support of i 2 B;
* Bi(!; z) := f x 2 RL+ : ps(x  eis) 6 V (!)z g, for every ! := (s; ps) 2M; z 2 RJ .
Then, the following Assertions hold, for each i 2 I:
(iv) fargni (!)gn2N converges to ! uniformly on Pi;
(v) 8s 2 S, fxisg = arg max ui(xi0; x), for x 2 Bi(!s ; zi ), along Assertions (i)-(ii)-(iii);
we denote by x
i!s
:= xis 2 RL+ a related consumption decision contingent on !s 2Ms;
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(vi) the correspondence ! 2 P i 7! arg max ui(xi0; x), for x 2 Bi(!; zi ), is a continuous
mapping, denoted by ! 7! xi!. The mapping, xi : ! 2 f0g [ P i 7! xi!, dened from
Assertions (ii), (v) and above, is a consumption plan, that is, xi 2 X(i );
(vii) Ui(

i ; x

i ) = limn!1 u
n
i (x
n
i ) 2 R+.
Proof see the Appendix. 
5.3 An equilibrium of the initial economy
We now prove Assertion (ii) of Theorem 1, via the following Claim.
Claim 5 The collection of prices, (!s), beliefs, (

i ), allocation, (x

i ), and portfolios,
(zi ), of Lemma 3, denes a C.F.E. of the economy E .
Proof Let us dene C := ((!s); (i ); [(xi ; zi )]) as in Claim 5. From Lemma 3-(ii)-(iii)-
(v)-(vi), C meets Conditions (c)-(d) of the above Denition 2 of equilibrium. The
relation f!sgs2S  \mi=1P (i ), that is, Condition (a) of Denition 2, also holds from
the denition of the structure (i ) 2 SB. To prove that C is a C.F.E., it su¢ ces to
show it meets the relation [(xi ; z

i )] 2 mi=1Bi(!0 ; i ) and Condition (b) of Denition 2.
We show, rst, that [(xi ; z

i )] 2 mi=1Bi(!0 ; i ), denote !0 = (p0 ; q) 2 M0, and let
i 2 I be given. From Lemma 2, the relations pn0 (xni0   ei0) 6  qnzni hold for each
n 2 Nnf1; :::; Ng, and yield in the limit (from Lemma 3-(i)-(ii)-(iii) and the continuity
of the scalar product): p0 (xi0   ei0) 6  qzi . From Lemma 3-(vi), the relations
ps(xi!   eis) 6 V (!)zi hold, for every ! = (s; ps) 2 P i . Then, Lemma 3-(vi) and all
above relations yield: (xi ; z

i ) 2 Bi(!0 ; i ). We have thus proved that C meets the
rst of the two desired conditions, [(xi ; z

i )] 2 mi=1Bi(!0 ; i ).
Next, we assume, by contraposition, that C fails to meet the second condition,
Denition 2-(b). Then, there exist i 2 I, (x; z) 2 Bi(!0 ; i ) and " 2 R++, such that:
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(I) "+ Ui(

i ; x

i ) < Ui(

i ; x).
We may assume that there exists  2 R++, such that:
(II) xl! > , for every (!; l) 2 f0g [ P i  L.
If not, for every  2]0; 1], we let (x; z) := ((1   )x + ei; (1   )z) 2 Bi(!0 ; i )
meet relations (II), from Assumption A1. Then, from relation (I) and the uniform
continuity (on a compact set) of (; !) 2 [0; 1]  P i 7! ui(x0 ; x!), the strategy (x; z)
also meets relation (I) for  small enough. So, we may indeed assume relations (II).
Then, we let the reader check, as tedious but straightforward, from the relations
(x; z) 2 Bi(!0 ; i ), !0 = (p0 ; q) 2 M0, and i 2 B, from the denitions of M0 and B,
Lemma 2-(v) and Lemma 3-(i), the above relations (I)-(II), Assumptions A1-A2 and
continuity arguments, that we may also assume there exists  2 R++, such that:
(III) p0 (x0   ei0) 6     qz and ps(x!   eis) 6   + V (!)z, 8! := (s; ps) 2 P i .
From (III), the continuity of the scalar product and of ! 7! V (!), and from
Lemma 3-(i)-(iii)-(vi), there exists N1 2 Nnf1; :::; Ng, such that, for every n > N1:
(IV )
26666664
pn0 (x0   ei0) 6  qnz
pns (x!s   eis) 6 V n(s)z; 8s 2 S
ps(x!   eis) 6 V (!)z; 8! := (s; ps) 2 
ni
.
Along relations (IV ) and Lemma 3-(i)-(v)-(iv), for each n > N1, we dene, in the
economy En , the strategy (xn; z) 2 Bni ([!ns ]) by: xn0 := x0, xns := x!s , for every s 2 S,
and xnsn := x!, for every sn := (i; !) 2 eSni . We recall that:
 Ui(i ; x) := 11+#S
R
!2Pi ui(x0; x!)di(!) +

1+#S
P
s2S ui(x0; x!s );
 uni (xn) :=
P
sn2eSni ui(x0; xnsn)ni (sn) + 1+#S
P
s2S ui(x0; x
n
s ).
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Then, from above, Lemma 3-(i)-(iv) and the uniform continuity of x 2 X(i ) and
ui on compact sets, there exists N2 > N1 such that:
(V ) jUi(i ; x)-uni (xn)j <
R
!2Pi jui(x0; x!)-ui(x0; xargni (!))jdi(!) < "2 , for every n > N2.
From equilibrium conditions and Lemma 3-(vii), there exists N3 > N2, such that:
(V I) uni (x
n) 6 uni (xni ) < "2 + Ui(

i ; x

i ), for every n > N3.
Let n > N3 be given. The above Conditions (I)-(V )-(V I) yield, jointly:
Ui(

i ; x) <
"
2 + u
n
i (x
n) 6 "2 + uni (xni ) < "+ Ui(

i ; x

i ) < Ui(

i ; x).
This contradiction proves that C is indeed a C.F.E. and Theorem 1-(ii) holds. 
Claim 6, below, completes the proof of Theorem 1 via the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 For each (i; k) 2 IN, we let k := 1k and denote simply by Uki the mapping
x 7! Ui(ki ; x), and by Ck = ((!ks); (ki ); [(xki ; zki )]) the related C.F.E., Ck, of Claim 5.
For every (! := (s; ps); z) 2 PiRJ , we let Bi(!; z) := fx 2 RL+ : ps(x eis) 6 V (!)zg be a
given set. Then, whenever   \mi=1Pi, the following Assertions hold for each i 2 I:
(i) for each s 2 S0, it may be assumed to exist prices, !s = limk!1 !ks 2Ms, such that
f!sgs2S  \mi=1Pi, and consumptions, xis = limk!1 xkis, such that
P
i2I(x

is eis) = 0;
(ii) it may be assumed to exist portfolios, zi = limk!1 zki , such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0;
(iii) 8s 2 S, fxisg = arg maxx2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(xi0; x) along Assertion (i)-(ii); we let xi!s := xis;
(iv) the correspondence ! 2 Pi 7! arg maxx2Bi(!;zi ) ui(xi0; x) is a continuous mapping,
denoted by ! 7! xi!. Its embedding, xi : ! 2 f0g [ Pi 7! xi!, dened from Assertions
(i)-(ii)-(iii) and above, is a consumption plan, that is, xi 2 X(i);
(v) for all x 2 X(i), Ui(i; x) = limk!1 Uki (x) 2 R+ and Ui(i; xi ) = limk!1 Uki (xki ) 2 R+.
Proof see the Appendix. 
27
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.37
Claim 6 Whenever   \mi=1Pi, the collection of prices, (!s) = limk!1(!ks), beliefs,
(i), allocation, (xi ), and portfolios, (zi ) = limk!1(zki ), of Lemma 4, is a C.F.E.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Claim 5. We assume that   \mi=1Pi and let
C := ((!s); (i); [(xi ; zi )]) be dened from Lemma 4. Given (i; k)2IN, the relations
f!ksgs2S    \mi=1Pi hold from Claim 5, and imply that P (ki ) = Pi, hence that,
Bi(!

0; i) and Bi(!k0 ; ki ) may only di¤er by one budget constraint at t = 0. From
Lemma 4, C meets Conditions (a)-(c)-(d) of Denition 2. Let us denote !0 = (p0; q) 2
M0 and !k0 = (pk0 ; qk) 2M0, for every k 2 N. Then, for every (i; k) 2 IN, the relations
pk0 (xki0 ei0) 6  qkzki hold, from Claim 5, and yield, in the limit, p0(xi0 ei0) 6  qzi ,
that is, from Lemma 4-(iv) and above: (xi ; zi ) 2 Bi(!0; i). Thus, Claim 6 will be
proved if we show that C meets Denition 2-(b). By contraposition, assume this is
not the case, i.e., there exists (i; (x; z); ") 2 IBi(!0; i)R++, such that:
(I) "+ Ui(i; x

i ) < Ui(i; x).
By the same token as for proving Claim 5, we may assume that the relation:
(II) p0(x0-ei0) 6     qz, holds for some  2 R++.
From (II), Lemma 4-(i), continuity arguments and the identity of Bi(!0; i) and
Bi(!
k
0 ; 
k
i ) on all second period budget constraints, there exists K 2 N, such that:
(III) (x; z) 2 Bi(!k0 ; i) = Bi(!k0 ; ki ), for every k > K.
Relations (I)-(III), Lemma 4-(v) and the fact that Ck is a C.F.E., yield:
(IV ) Ui(i; x) <
"
2+U
k
i (x) 6 "2+Uki (xki ) < "+Ui(i; xi ) < Ui(i; x), for k > K big enough.
From this contradiction, C is a CFE; the proof of Theorem 1 is now complete. 
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Appendix: proof of the Lemmas
Lemma 1 For each i 2 I and each n 2 N, there exists a nite partition, Pni , and a
nite subset, 
ni , of Pi, such that the following Assertions hold:
(i) 8P 2 Pni ; P 2 B(M) and i(P ) > 0, and (
1i ) 2 AS;
(ii) 
ni  
n+1i , and, for every P 2 Pni , P \ 
ni is a singleton;
(iii) 8! 2 Pi, 9!0 2 
ni : k!0   !k 6 L#S = n, and, hence, Pi = [n2N
ni ;
(iv) 9N 2 N; 8(P i )  (Pi), [(
Ni )  (P i ) and #P i 2 N, 8i 2 I]) [Qc[(P i )] 6= ?].
Proof Let i 2 I be given and, for each n 2 N, let:
Kn := fkn := (k1n; :::; kLn ) 2 (N \ [1; 2n])Lg;
P kns := Pi \ (fsgl2f1;:::;Lg]k
l
n 1
2n ;
kln
2n ]), for every (s; kn := (k
1
n; :::; k
L
n )) 2 SiKn.
For each (s; n; kn) 2 SiNKn, such that P kns 6= ?, we select a unique !kns 2 P kns ,
and dene a set, 
ni := f!kns 2 P kns : s 2 Si; kn 2 Kn; P kns 6= ?g, as follows:
 for n = 1, we select one !k1s 2 Pi, for each s 2 Si; we take !k1s 2 \mi=1Pi 6= ?,
whenever possible, and let 
1i := f!k1s : s 2 Sig;
 for n > 1 arbitrary, given 
n 1i := f!kn 1s 2 P kn 1s : s 2 Si; kn 1 2 Kn 1; P kn 1s 6= ?g,
we let, for every (s; kn) 2 Si Kn, such that P kns 6= ?,3
!kns
8>><>>:
be equal to !
kn 1
s , if there exists kn 1 2 Kn 1; such that !kn 1s 2 
n 1i \ P kns
be set fixed in P kns ; if 

n 1
i \ P kns = ?
This yields, for each n 2 N, a subset, 
ni := f!kns : s 2 Si; kn 2 Kn; P kns 6= ?g, and a
partition, Pni := fP kns : s 2 Si; kn 2 Kn; P kns 6= ?g, of Pi, satisfying Lemma 1-(i)-(ii)-(iii).
We now prove Lemma 1-(iv), after noticing, from Lemma 1-(i)-(ii), that (
Ni ) 2 AS.
3 Up to a shift in the upper boundary of Pkns , if required, we assume costlessly that i(P
kn
s ) > 0 when P
kn
s 6= ?.
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For each (i; n) 2 IN, we dene the vector space Zni := fz 2 RJ : V (!)z = 0;8! 2 
ni g
and its orthogonal, Zn?i , and, similarly, Zi := fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 Pig and Z?i .
We show, rst, that, for each i 2 I, there exists Ni 2 N, such that Zni = Zi , for
every n > Ni. Indeed, from Lemma 1-(ii), fZni gn2N is non increasing in RJ , hence,
stationary, i.e., there exists Ni 2 N, such that Zni = ZNii , for all n > Ni. From the
denition, the relation Zi  ZNii holds. The converse inclusion, hence, Zi = ZNii , is
immediate from Lemma 1-(iii): for all n > Ni, take zn 2 Z?i \ Zni , such that kznk = 1
and derive a contradiction. Then, we dene No = maxi2I Ni and the compact set
Z := f(zi) 2 mi=1Z?i : k(zi)k = 1;
Pm
i=1 zi 2
Pm
i=1 Z

i g.
Assume, by contraposition, that Lemma 1-(vi) fails. Then, from above, Denition
3, and from [4] (Denition 2.2, p. 397, and Proposition 3.1, p.401), for every n > No,
there exist an integer, Nn > n, nite sets, PNni , dened for each i 2 I, and portfolios,
(zni ) 2 Z, such that: (
Nni )  (PNni )  (Pi) and V (!i)  zni > 0, for every (i; !i) 2 I  PNni ,
with one strict inequality. The sequence, f(zni )gn>No , may be assumed to converge in
a compact set, say to (zi ) 2 Z. From the continuity of the scalar product and Lemma
1-(iii), the above relations on f(zni )gn>No , imply that V (!i)  zi > 0 holds, for every
(i; !i) 2 IPi, with one strict inequality, since (zi ) 2 Z implies k(zi )k = 1. We let the
reader check (on asset prices), this contradicts the fact that (Pi) is arbitrage-free. 
Lemma 2 For each n > N along Lemma 1, the economy En admits an equilibrium,
Cn , namely, a collection of prices, !n0 := (pn0 ; qn) 2M0, at t = 0, and !ns := (s; pns ) 2Ms,
in each state s 2 S, and strategies, (xni ; zni ) 2 Bni ([!ns ]), for each i 2 I, such that :
(i) 8i 2 I; (xni ; zni ) 2 arg max(x;z)2Bni ([!ns ]) uni (x);
(ii) 8s 2 S0; Pmi=1 (xnis   eis) = 0;
(iii)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium, Cn , satises the following Assertions:
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(iv) 8(n; i; s) 2 Nnf1; :::; Ng  I  S0, xnis 2 [0; E]L, where E := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is;
(v) 9" 2]0; 1] : pnls > ", 8(n; s; l) 2 Nnf1; :::; Ng  S L.
Proof Let n > N be given along Lemma 1. From Lemma 1-(iv), the payo¤ and in-
formation structure of the economy En , [V n; (Sni )], is arbitrage-free, along [4]. Hence,
from ([6], Theorem 1 and proof) it admits an equilibrium, or (changing notations)
a collection of prices, !n0 := (pn0 ; qn) 2 M0, !ns := (s; pns ) 2 Ms, for each s 2 S, and
strategies, (xni ; zni ) 2 Bni ([!ns ]), for each i 2 I, which satisfy Lemma 2-(i)-(ii)-(iii). The
rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1-(i) (simpler) and left to the reader. 
Lemma 3 For the above sequence, fCn g, of equilibria, it may be assumed to exist:
(i) !s = limn!1 !
n
s 2Ms, for each s 2 S0;
(ii) (xis) := limn!1 (x
n
is)i2I 2 RLm, such that
P
i2I (x

is   eis) = 0, for each s 2 S0;
(iii) (zi ) = limn!1(z
n
i )i2I 2 RJm, such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0.
Moreover, we dene, for each i 2 I and each n 2 N, the following sets and mappings:
* the mapping, ! 2 Pi 7! argni (!) 2 
ni , such that one P 2 Pni satises (!; argni (!) 2 P 2;
* from Assertion (i) and Lemma 2-(v), the belief, i := 11+#S ( i + 
P
s2S s),
where s is (for each s 2 S) the Diracs measure of !s;
* P i = Pi [ f!sgs2S, the support of i 2 B;
* Bi(!; z) := f x 2 RL+ : ps(x  eis) 6 V (!)z g, for every ! := (s; ps) 2M; z 2 RJ .
Then, the following Assertions hold, for each i 2 I:
(iv) fargni (!)gn2N converges to ! uniformly on Pi;
(v) 8s 2 S, fxisg = arg max ui(xi0; x), for x 2 Bi(!s ; zi ), along Assertions (i)-(ii)-(iii);
we denote by x
i!s
:= xis 2 RL+ a related consumption decision contingent on !s 2Ms;
(vi) the correspondence ! 2 P i 7! arg max ui(xi0; x), for x 2 Bi(!; zi ), is a continuous
mapping, denoted by ! 7! xi!. The mapping, xi : ! 2 f0g [ P i 7! xi!, dened from
Assertions (ii), (v) and above, is a consumption plan, that is, xi 2 X(i );
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(vii) Ui(

i ; x

i ) = limn!1 u
n
i (x
n
i ) 2 R+.
Proof Assertions (i)-(ii) result from Lemma 2-(iv) and compactness arguments. 
Assertion (iii) For each i 2 I, we let Zi := fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 Pig and
recall, from Lemma 1s proof, that Zi = fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 
ni g, for all n>N
(assuming N>No). The sequence f(zni )i2Ign>N is bounded. Indeed, let  := maxi2I keik.
The denition of fCngn>N yields, from budget constraints and clearance conditions:
(I) [
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0 and V (!i)zni >  , 8(i; !i) 2 I  
ni ], for every n > N .
Assume, by contradiction, f(zni )g is unbounded, i.e., there exists an extracted
sequence, f(z'(n)i )g, such that n < k(z'(n)i )k 6 n+1, for every n > N . From (I), the
portfolios (zni ) := 1n (z
'(n)
i ) meet the relations 1 < k(zni )k 6 1+ 1n , for every n > N , and:
(II)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0 and V (!i)zni >   n , 8(i; !i) 2 I  
ni .
From (II), Lemma 1-(ii), the continuity of the scalar product and above, the
sequence f(zni )g may be assumed to converge, say to (zi ), such that k(zi )k = 1 and:
(III)
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0 and V (!i)zi > 0, 8(i; !i) 2 I
Ni .
From relations (III), Lemma 1-(iv), ([4], Proposition 3.1) and above, the relation
(zi ) 2 mi=1Zi holds and implies (zi ) = 0, from the elimination of useless deals of sub-
Section 2.4, which contradicts the fact that k(zi )k = 1. Hence, the sequence f(zni )g
is bounded and may be assumed to converge, say to (zi ) 2 RJm. Then, the relationPm
i=1 z

i = 0 results asymptotically from the clearance conditions of Lemma 2-(iv). 
Assertions (iv) is immediate from the denition and compactness arguments. 
Assertion (v) Let (i; s) 2 IS be given. For every tuple (n; ! := (s; ps); !0; z) 2
N nf1; :::; NgMsMsRJ , we consider the following (possibly empty) sets:
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Bi(!; z) := fy 2 RL+ : ps(y eis) 6 V (!)zg and B0i(!; !0; z) := fy 2 RL+ : ps(y eis) 6 V (!0)zg.
For each n > N , the fact that Cn is an equilibrium of En implies, from Lemma 2:
(I) (!n 1s ; !
n
s ) 2M2s and xnis 2 arg maxy2B0i(!ns ;!n 1s ;zni ) ui(x
n
i0; y).
As a standard application of Berges Theorem (see, e.g., [8], p. 19), the corre-
spondence (x; !; !0; z) 2 RL+MsMsRJ 7! arg maxy2B0i(!;!0;z) ui(x; y), which is actually
a mapping (from Assumption A2 ), is continuous at (xi0; !s ; !s ; z

i ), since ui and B0i
are continuous. Moreover, the relation (xi0; x

is; !

s ; z

i ) = limn!1(x
n
i0; x
n
is; !
n
s ; z
n
i ) holds
from Lemma 2-(i)-(ii)-(iii). Hence, the relations (I) pass to that limit and yield:
fx
i!s
g := fxisg = arg maxy2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(x

i0; y). 
Assertion (vi) Let i 2 I be given. For every (!; n) 2 PiN n f1; :::; Ng, the fact that
Cn is an equilibrium of En and Assumption A2 yield:
(I) fxniargni (!)g = arg max ui(x
n
i0; y) for y 2 Bi(argni (!); zni ).
From Lemma 2-(ii)-(iii)-(iv), the relation (!; xi0; z

i ) = limn!1(arg
n
i (!); x
n
i0; z
n
i ) holds,
whereas, from Assumption A2 and ([8], p. 19), the correspondence (x; !; z) 2
RL+PiRJ 7! arg maxy2Bi(!;z) ui(x; y) is a continuous mapping, since ui and Bi are
continuous. Hence, passing to the limit into relations (I) yields a continuous map-
ping, ! 2 Pi 7! xi! := arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i0; y), which, from Lemma 3-(v) and above,
is embedded into a continuous mapping, xi : ! 2 f0g[P i 7! xi!, i.e., xi 2 X(i ). 
Assertion (vii) Let i 2 I and xi 2 X(i ) be given, along Lemma 3-(vi). Let 'i :
(x; !; z) 2 RL+PiRJ 7! arg maxy2Bi(!;z) ui(x; y) be dened on its domain. By the same
token as for proving Assertion (vi), 'i and Ui : (x; !; z) 2 RL+PiRJ 7! ui(x; 'i(x; !; z))
are continuous mappings and, moreover, the relations ui(xi0; x

i!) = Ui(x

i0; !; z

i ) and
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ui(x
n
i0; x
n
i argni (!)
) = Ui(x
n
i0; arg
n
i (!); z
n
i ) hold, for every (!; n) 2 PiN n f1; :::; Ng. Then, the
uniform continuity of ui and Ui on compact sets, and Lemma 3-(ii)-(iii)-(iv) yield:
(I) 8" > 0; 9N" > N : 8n > N"; 8! 2 Pi,
j ui(xi0; xi!)  ui(xni0; xni argni (!)) j +
P
s2S j ui(xi0; xis)  ui(xni0; xnis) j < ".
Moreover, we recall the following denitions, for every n > N :
(II) Ui(

i ; x

i ) :=
1
1+#S
R
!2Pi ui(x

i0; x

i!)di(!) + 
1
1+#S
P
s2S ui(x

i0; x

is);
(III) uni (x
n
i ) :=
1
1+#S
R
!2Pi ui(x
n
i0; x
n
i argni (!)
)di(!) + 
1
1+#S
P
s2S ui(x
n
i0; x
n
is).
Then, Lemma 3-(vii) results immediately from relations (I)-(II)-(III) above. 
Proof of Lemma 4 It is similar to that of Lemma 3, hence, left to the reader. 
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